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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUE PROCESS REQUIRES
PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT
FOR JUVENILES
In In re Winship," the United States Supreme Court held
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is among the constitutional protections of the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment available to a juvenile who is charged with an
act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.
A judge of the New York Family Court found that appellant, then twelve years old, had stolen $112 from a woman's
pocketbook taken from a locker. This finding was based on
a preponderance of the evidence in accordance with the requirements of a New York Statute.2 The statute provided that
"[a]ny determination at the conclusion of [an adjudicatory]
hearing that a [juvenile] did an act or acts must be based on
a preponderance of the evidence. '3 Subsequently, appellant
was placed in a training school for a period of eighteen months
subject to annual extensions until appellant reached eighteen.
Whether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required under
the fourteenth amendment was raised at the original adjudicatory proceeding by appellant's attorney.
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
First Department affirmed, 4 as did the New York Court of
Appeals 5 in an opinion expressly upholding the constitutionali1 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
2 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT

§ 744(b) (McKinney 1963).

3 Id., quoted in In e Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 360 (1970).
4 In re Samuel W., 30 App. Div. 2d 781, N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1968)
(mem.), aff'd sub nom. Samuel W. v. N.Y. Family Ct., 24
N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d 253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), rev'd
sub nom. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
Samuel W. v. N.Y. Family Ct., 24 N.Y.2d 196, 247 N.E.2d
253, 299 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969), rev'd sub noma. In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970).
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ty of the New York Statute. The United States Supreme Court
7
noted probable jurisdiction6 and reversed.
Three years earlier, in the case of In Te Gault,8 the Supreme Court determined the constitutional guaranties which
are to be extended to juveniles in adjudicatory proceedings.
The guaranties enumerated were: the right to adequate written notice of the charges; the right to be represented by counsel, and if indigent, the right to court appointed counsel; the
right to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses; and
the privilege against self-incrimination. These guaranties are
required by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court limited the application of these constitutional
guaranties to the adjudicatory phase of juvenile proceedings.
Therefore, Gault did not affect whatever beneficial elements
existed in the less stringent formality of the pre-judicial and
post-adjudicative processes.9
Special standards for juvenile proceedings are based on
the idea that criminal courts are too harsh for youthful defendants, and that youthful offenders are to be guided and
helped rather than punished.10 Thus, the state was said to act
as guardian in the place of the parent,1 1 and its juvenile proceedings were not criminal in nature.12 These proceedings
were supposed to be secret, and the juvenile was not considered as a person convicted of a crime.18
Dissenting in Winship, Mr. Chief Justice Burger, joined
6 In

r.e Winship, 396 U.S. 885 (1969).
397 U.S. 358.
8 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9 Id. at 21.
10 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200
(1905).
n State v. Dunn, 53 Ore. 304, 307, 99 P. 278, 280 (1909).
12 State v. Santana, 444 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tex. 1969), vacated
sub nom. Santana v. Texas, 397 U. S. 596 (1970) (per
curiam).
13 State v. Arenas, 453 P.2d 915, 918 (Ore. 1969).
'
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by Mr. Justice Stewart, argued that the application of procedural restrictions to juvenile proceedings would negate the
beneficial aspects of the proceedings and would "transform
juvenile courts into criminal courts."14 However, since the
general introduction of juvenile courts from 50 to 100 years
ago, beneficial changes in adult criminal proceedings and increased deficiencies in juvenile proceedings have resulted in
a situation where "the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor
the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children."'-I Moreover, the argument that juvenile courts may
refuse to apply constitutional guaranties on the grounds that
the proceedings are benevolent was expressly rejected in In
Te Gault.',
There was no mention in Gault of the burden of proof
standard to be applied in adjudicatory stages of juvenile proceedings. Indeed, the Supreme Court had never directly held
the commonly accepted standard of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt-in criminal cases to be constitutionally required.
However, it has been assumed for some time that this standard
was constitutionally required in criminal cases. For instance,
in Davis v. United States,17 the Court stated:
No man should be deprived of his life under the forms
of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon
their consciences, to say that the evidence before
them, by whomsoever adduced, is sufficient to show
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
Again in Speiser v. Randall,8 the Court said:
There is always in litigation a margin of error, rep14 397 U.S. at 376.
'5

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)
omitted).

(footnote

16 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).

160 U.S. 469, 493 (1895).
18 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
17
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resenting error in factfinding, which both parties must
take into account. Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to
him by the process of placing on the other party the
burden of ...

persuading the factfinder at the con-

clusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Any uncertainty concerning the standard of proof required in criminal cases was finally put to rest with the holding in Winship.
Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 19
The Court, in Winship, followed the traditional resolution of the issue placed before it by first deciding that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required by the Constitution
and then applying the standard to juveniles when subjected
to the adjudicatory phase of proceedings against them. The
extension of the reasonable-doubt standard of proof to juvenile
proceedings is in accord with earlier decisions of both state
20
and federal courts.
In the opinions and footnotes, the justices continued their
debate as to the proper interpretation of the due process
clause. Mr. Justice Black, in a vigorous dissent,21 would give
the due process clause a strict interpretation, thus allowing
any state to handle its juvenile proceedings, or for that matter
other criminal proceedings, in any manner it chose as long
as such proceedings did not violate the limited and specific
1 397 U.S. at 364.
20

21

In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967); United
States v. Constanzo, 395 F.2d 441 (4th Cir. 1968); Jones v.
Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 38 S.E.2d 444 (1946).
397 U.S. at 377.
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prohibitions of the Constitution. 22 Mr. Justice Black made an
effective argument to use a strict interpretation of the Constitution as a limit on the power of the judiciary, claiming
that the legislature of each state has the power to specify
the laws to be followed by that state and that the requirements of the due process clause are not violated if such laws
are followed.2 The majority is consistent in upholding the
fairness doctrine, 24 holding that due process does not mean
simply in accordance with the particular procedural laws of
a state but rather in accordance with the "concept of ordered liberty."'2
One effect of Winship will be to reinforce those lower
courts which have been in the forefront of extending criminal
procedural guaranties to juveniles, 26 where such guaranties
have been held constitutionally required for adults by the
Supreme Court.
However, neither the Winship nor the Gault decision
indicates that juvenile courts, as separate and distinct bodies
where youthful offenders may be specifically treated, are
on their way out. Rather they are a reaffirmation of the existence of certain basic minimum rights, guaranteed by the
Constitution, which cannot be taken away by any jurisdiction
merely by creating a separate benevolent proceeding. Whenever the accused stands to lose his liberty or be otherwise
severely restrained, his constitutional guaranties may not be
infringed.
Serge Novovich
22 Id. at 385-86.
2 Id. But see Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 430 (1970)
(Black, J., dissenting) ("[C]onstitutional due process requires the Government to prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt before it can convict the accused of the
crime it deliberately and clearly defined.").
24 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
21i Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
26 Leach v. State, 428 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (Johnson, J., concurring); In re Aaron D., 30 App. Div. 2d 183,
290 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1968).

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1971

5

